Discrepancies between Judgment and Choice of Action in Moral Dilemmas by Sébastien Tassy et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 16 May 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00250
Discrepancies between judgment and choice of action in
moral dilemmas
SébastienTassy 1,2, Olivier Oullier 3, Julien Mancini 4,5 and BrunoWicker 1,6*
1 Institut de Neurosciences de la Timone, CNRS UMR 7289, Aix-Marseille Université, Marseille, France
2 Assistance Publique – Department of Psychiatry, Hôpitaux de Marseille, Sainte Marguerite University Hospital, Marseille, France
3 Cognitive Psychology Lab, UMR CNRS 7920, Research Federation 3C (FR 3512), Aix-Marseille Université, Marseille, France
4 Teaching and Research Laboratory of Medical Information (LERTIM), School of Medicine, Aix Marseille University, Marseille, France
5 Assistance Publique – Hôpitaux de Marseille, La Timone University Hospital, Public Health and Medical Information Department (SSPIM), Marseille, France
6 Integrative Neurosciences Laboratory, Physics Department, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Edited by:
Carl Senior, Aston University, UK
Reviewed by:
Carl Senior, Aston University, UK
Fiery Cushman, Brown University,
USA
*Correspondence:
BrunoWicker , Mediterranean
Institute of Cognitive Neurosciences,
CNRS UMR 6193, 31 Chemin Joseph
Aiguier, 13009 Marseille, France.
e-mail: wicker@incm.cnrs-mrs.fr
Everyone has experienced the potential discrepancy between what one judges as morally
acceptable and what one actually does when a choice between alternative behaviors is to
be made. The present study explores empirically whether judgment and choice of action
differ when people make decisions on dilemmas involving moral issues. Two hundred and
forty participants evaluated 24 moral and non-moral dilemmas either by judging (“Is it
acceptable to. . .”) or reporting the choice of action they would make (“Would you do. . .”).
We also investigated the influence of varying the number of people benefiting from the
decision and the closeness of relationship of the decision maker with the potential victim
on these two types of decision. Variations in the number of beneficiaries from the decision
did not influence judgment nor choice of action. By contrast, closeness of relationship with
the victim had a greater influence on the choice of action than on judgment.This differenti-
ation between evaluative judgments and choices of action argues in favor of each of them
being supported by (at least partially) different psychological processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Many important individual or social moral decisions require the
evaluation of dilemmas leading to outcomes of variable values
and consequences. In the domain of moral cognition, prototypi-
cal experimental settings often use hypothetical contexts in which
individuals have to make life and death decisions in a range of cir-
cumstances designed to pit various principles against one another
(Greene et al., 2001; Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006). Moral philoso-
phers, evolutionary biologists, and psychologists have identified
several critical factors that may influence moral decision mak-
ing, such as the distinction between action and omission or the
distinction between harm as a means and harm as a side-effect
(Cushman et al., 2006; Schaich Borg et al., 2006; Bartels, 2008).
Other studies have confirmed that many dimensions incorporated
into the hypothetical dilemmas systematically influenced partic-
ipants’ responses (Christensen and Gomila, 2012). For instance,
people are more inclined to approve of options that spare the
greater number of individuals, options that spare kin or friends,
and options that spare humans vs. non-humans (Petrinovich et al.,
1993; O’Neill and Petrinovich, 1998; Nichols and Mallon, 2006). In
most studies, participants were required to evaluate moral dilem-
mas by answering various questions, ranging from “Is it acceptable
to. . .”to“Would you do. . .in order to. . ..”Interestingly, these differ-
ent questions may target different psychological processes (Monin
et al., 2007) that potentially rely on distinct neural underpin-
nings (Schaich Borg et al., 2006). Choice differs from judgment
because it implies projecting oneself in a direct interaction using
an egocentric frame of reference with potential self-relevant conse-
quences as emphasized by Sood and Forehand (2005). By contrast,
judging relies on an evaluation of the situation from a more allo-
centric perspective (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005). It is important
to note that both types of decision making may rely on normatives
aspects and address the commonsense notion that if something
is right, one should accept to/do it (Manstead, 2000). Therefore
the distinction between judgment and personal action taking may
appear quite fundamental (FeldmanHall et al., 2012). Recently,
several experiments have provided evidence that this difference
between ego- and allocentric perspectives should be seriously
taken into account (Frith and de Vignemont, 2005). For instance,
Nadelhoffer and Feltz (2008) showed that responses during moral
dilemma evaluation differed when evaluators were agents in the
question rather than observers. Along the same line, distinct brain
regions are activated during participants’ intuition about their own
and others’ moral transgression (Berthoz et al., 2006). Such dif-
ference may explain the variation in the degree of utilitarianism
of responses to various dilemmas inducing an abstract judgment
(reaction to moral violation by another person) or a choice of
action (i.e., from a first person perspective; Monin et al., 2007).
It could also explain why people acknowledge moral norms and
make appropriate moral judgment but fail to act accordingly,
illustrating a capacity for “moral hypocrisy” (Batson et al., 1997;
Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2007). Data from studies of psychopathic
individuals and patients with brain lesions who bear intact moral
judgment yet consistently commit immoral acts further suggest
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this possible dissociation (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985; Glenn
et al., 2009a,b; Tassy et al., 2009; Cima et al., 2010). However, to
our knowledge, a clear experimental evidence of distinct responses
to dilemmas with questions targeting both hypothetical judgment
and choice of action is still lacking1.
The present study explores empirically and systematically if
decisions made in the context of moral judgment or of moral
choice of action differ, and how variations in the contextual fram-
ing of the dilemma participate to this difference. We hypothesize
that if judgment and choice of action are influenced differently by
variations of qualitative parameters framing the moral dilemma,
it might suggest that they rely on distinct cognitive processes, as
recently proposed in a neuroscientific experiment (Tassy et al.,
2012). Because these two parameters have been shown to influ-
ence decision during moral dilemma evaluation, in the present
experiment we varied: (i) the number of people benefiting from
the potential decision (utilitarian preference), with the hypothesis
that one favors unknown individuals when they are a substan-
tial number therefore maximizing aggregate welfare (Petrinovich
et al., 1993; Shenhav and Greene, 2010; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011)
and therefore overriding our tribal instinct (Boyd et al., 2011),
and reflecting the development of rules at the heart of complex
societies (Hayek, 1979; Tassy et al., 2007); and (ii) the degree to
which the potential victim of the scenario is related to the partici-
pant/decision maker (closeness of relationship) with the hypothesis
that we favor the individual(s) that are socially close to us because
of cognitive mechanisms at stake when human beings evolve in
restricted groups (Richerson and Boyd, 2001; Thomas et al., 2011;
Kurzban et al., 2012).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Two hundred and forty students volunteered in the experiment
and were randomly divided into 8 groups of 30. Groups were
matched on the basis of age, gender, education level, mother
tongue, number of siblings, and religious practice.
MATERIALS
Stimuli consisted of 15 dilemmas with moral content and 9
non-moral control dilemmas. The basic framework of dilem-
mas scenarios was either directly inspired from a previous battery
developed by Greene et al. (2001), adapted to take into account
cultural differences and validated by the experimenters in a pre-
vious study (Tassy et al., 2012). The nine non-moral dilemmas
required decision making in situations with no moral connotation
whatsoever (cf. Appendix).
Eight different versions of each moral dilemma (A, B, C, D, E, F,
G, H), for a total of 120 moral dilemmas, were presented in eight
different questionnaires. Each group of participants therefore
completed one of the eight questionnaires.
1Our study is not immune to the usual critic that can be raised in this kind of settings
involving moral dilemmas: here what we consider an action is obviously what the
participants think their action could be if they were to make the decision in real life.
For ethical reason, using questionnaire is as far as we can go given the life and death
nature of the dilemmas.
Versions A, B, C, and D: the independent variable was the num-
ber of people that could potentially benefit from the judgment
and choice of action, ranging from less than four (versions A) to
hundreds or thousands (Versions D). The figures were adapted
to ensure plausibility of the scenarios. In all versions the poten-
tial victim of the decision had no affective proximity with the
evaluator.
Versions E, F, G, and H: the independent variable was the affective
proximity between the participant who had to make a decision
and the potential victim(s) of the decision. Versions E always
involved a first-degree relative (father, brother, sister, son, mother,
daughter, . . .); versions F a second degree relative (cousin, uncle,
. . .); versions G a close friend or relation; versions H involved
unknown individuals with no affective or genetic proximity (e.g.,
the baker). The number of people that would potentially benefit
from the decision was kept constant throughout the versions.
Non-moral dilemmas were identical in all questionnaires. The
order of presentation of moral and non-moral dilemmas was
counterbalanced within and between questionnaires.
TASK AND DATA COLLECTION
Anonymous paper and pencil questionnaires were used. The ques-
tionnaire started with socio-demographic questions to collect
anonymous data on gender, familyhood, age, level of education,
work, marital status, children, religion, and mother tongue.
After reading each dilemma, the participant had to answer suc-
cessively two questions by Yes or No: “Is it acceptable to . . .?”
(Judgment condition) and “Would you . . .?” (Choice of action
condition).
Participants were instructed to imagine each hypothetical situ-
ation as vividly and realistically as they could and to be as honest
as possible in their decision. In addition, we insisted on the anony-
mous nature of the questionnaires and instructed participants not
to go back to check and/or change any of their prior responses.
ETHICS STATEMENT
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. The
French Law does not require approval of an ethics committee when
data from a questionnaire are collected and analyzed anonymously.
DATA PROCESSING
For non-moral dilemmas, “appropriate” responses implied the
maximization of beneficence overall consequences (e.g., buying
a new television instead of repairing the old one for the same
price was coded 1 and “inappropriate” was coded 0). For moral
dilemmas, response to each question was coded 1 if it favored
maximizing the good of more people at the expense of very few
identified individuals (“utilitarian” response; e.g., sacrificing one
person’s life to save five), and zero for the reverse situation.
For the analysis of the difference of responses between condi-
tions (Judgment-Choice of action) for each dilemma, we quoted 1
when judgment response was utilitarian but choice was not,−1 for
the reverse situation and 0 when judgment and choice responses
were identical.
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS software Version
17.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
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Probabilities of utilitarian responses in judgment and choice of
action conditions were calculated for all dilemmas.
We compared responses between judgment and choice condi-
tions using paired t -tests.
To characterize the effect of the variation of the two variables
(i.e., number of lives saved and affective proximity) on both the
judgment and choice of action, we performed a logistic regression
analysis.
To statistically test the possibility that the two variables could
have a different effect on the two conditions, we further performed
an ordinal regression on the differences of responses between
conditions for each dilemma.
To account for the non-independence of within-subject
responses, regression models were fitted using the generalized
estimating equations method (Koenigs et al., 2007).
RESULTS
NON-MORAL DILEMMAS
Probabilities of appropriate response were identical in the judg-
ment (appropriate M = 0.89; SD= 0.12), and choice (Appropri-
ate M = 0.89; SD= 0.11) conditions [p(paired t -test)= 0.879;
Figure 1].
MORAL DILEMMAS
Overall difference between judgment and choice of action
We first determined whether the two dimensions incorporated into
the dilemmas (affective proximity and number of people saved)
resulted in systematic differences in responses in both conditions
(judgment vs. choice of action). The probability of utilitarian
response is significantly lower in the judgment condition than in
the choice of action condition, whatever the type of variable (judg-
ment condition M = 0.43; SD= 0.18; choice condition M = 0.51;
SD= 0.17; p < 0.001; Figure 1). This suggests that participants
choose to endorse actions they judge unacceptable.
Effect of the variation of the number of people benefiting from the
decision
A significant effect of the variations of the number of people
benefiting from the decision was observed in both judgment
[OR= 1.19 (1.09; 1.29); p < 0.001] and choice of action condi-
tions [OR= 1.19 (1.09; 1.30); p < 0.001] (Figure 2; Table 1). The
more the number of lives saved is high, the more participants tend
to be utilitarian in their judgment and choice of action.
As shown by OR values, variations in the number of lives saved
seem to influence identically the responses in both conditions.
The ordinal regression on the differences of responses between
conditions for each dilemma did not yield any significant results
[cumulative proportional OR= 0.99, 95% confidence interval
(0.91; 1.08); p= 0.850]. It further indicates that the effect of people
benefiting from the decision is identical in both conditions.
Effect of affective proximity variations
A significant effect of the variation of affective proximity is
observed in both judgment [OR= 1.17 (1.07; 1.27); p < 0.001]
and choice of action [OR= 1.49 (1.36; 1.62); p < 0.001] con-
ditions (Figure 3; Table 2). Moreover, the effect is significantly
stronger in the choice of action than in the judgment condi-
tion (ORchoice>ORjudgment). This is confirmed by the ordinal
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FIGURE 1 | Overall probability of utilitarian response in both conditions
(Gray bars: choice of action condition; black bars: judgment condition).
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FIGURE 2 | Influence of the variation of number of live saved on the
probability of utilitarian response in both conditions.
regression which revealed a significant influence of affective prox-
imity on the difference of responses between judgment and choice
of action [cumulative proportional odds ratio (OR)= 0.80, 95%
confidence interval (0.73; 0.87); p < 0.001], proving that the effect
is indeed different in both conditions. Implication of a close
relative has thus a stronger influence on behavioral choice of
action.
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Table 1 | Probability of utilitarian judgment when varying the number
of people benefiting from the decision.
Variations Probability of
utilitarian
judgment (SD)
Probability of
utilitarian
choice of action (SD)
p(Paired
t -test)
E 0.38 (0.18) 0.30 (0.21) 0.009
F 0.42 (0.19) 0.40 (0.22) 0.464
G 0.43 (0.17) 0.49 (0.18) 0.143
H 0.50 (0.17) 0.58 (0.18) 0.010
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FIGURE 3 | Influence of affective proximity variations on the
probability of utilitarian response in both conditions.
Table 2 | Probability of utilitarian judgment when varying affective
proximity.
Variations Probability of
utilitarian
judgment (SD)
Probability of
utilitarian
choice of action (SD)
p(Paired
t -test)
A 0.35 (0.21) 0.47 (0.2) 0.025
B 0.45 (0.21) 0.60 (0.17) 0.002
C 0.45 (0.21) 0.55 (0.22) 0.006
D 0.50 (0.20) 0.63 (0.20) 0.004
DISCUSSION
The very high number of appropriates responses for both judg-
ment and choice when facing non-moral dilemmas illustrates that
participants were able to make appropriate decisions. Further-
more, in this non-moral context responses were coherent across
conditions of judgment and choice of action.
In the case of moral dilemmas, we first observe a dissociation
between judgment and choice of action, with responses to choice
of action being overall more utilitarian than responses to judg-
ment. Quite surprisingly, participants would thus generally accept
to perform an action they have judged as morally unacceptable.
Everyone has experienced the potential discrepancy between what
one judges as right, from a moral point of view, and what one
actually does when a choice between alternative behaviors is to
be made. This is coherent with a recent study reporting that a
substantial fraction of participants chose an action they judged
morally wrong during moral dilemma evaluation (Kurzban’s et al.,
2012). Such a discrepancy was also already noted in the field of
developmental psychology, with results showing that although a
relationship does exist between moral thought and action, corre-
lation between the two was weak and inconsistent (Blasi, 1980).
This was recently illustrated experimentally in real dilemmas situa-
tions in which participants agreed to inflict more pain to someone
than what they judged as being acceptable (FeldmanHall et al.,
2012). Moral judgment can thus conflict with effective behav-
ior, supporting the proposition to integrate a separate measure of
moral norm in the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) to enhance
its predictive utility (Manstead, 2000). This discrepancy between a
judgment and the associated act also resonates with what is termed
Akrasia in the philosophical literature (i.e., acting against one’s
own judgment). To explain such phenomena, Davidson (2001)
proposed that the mind could be partitioned into two quasi-
independent systems: one that finds a certain course of action
to be best all things considered, and another that prompts a dif-
ferent course of action. Our results suggest that this seems to be
especially true in the context of decision making during hypothet-
ical moral dilemma evaluation and that the process at play during
moral evaluative judgment and subjective action choice could be
at least partially different. At the cerebral level, previous results of a
rTMS study using identical dilemmas and tasks suggest that right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFc) disruption alters moral
judgment but not choice (Tassy et al., 2012). Moral judgment
thus involves a brain network in which the rDLPFc is required to
process allocentric integration of contextual information. By con-
trast, the fact that psychopathy characterized by serious immoral
behavior and a dysfunction of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
leaves moral judgment intact (Cima et al., 2010) suggest that moral
action choice would mainly rely mainly on VMPFc function.
Our second observation is that the more the number of lives
saved is high, the more participants tend to be utilitarian in their
judgment and choice of action. This result is in line with findings
from previous studies on moral judgment studying responses to
a single question close to our choice of action condition (O’Neill
and Petrinovich, 1998; Shenhav and Greene, 2010). It suggests
that cognitive processes (either common or distinct) that lead to
judgment or choice of action are identically influenced when par-
ticipants engage in strict cost-benefit analysis (“expected moral
value”) i.e., balancing the cost for the potential victim against
the benefit for an increasing number of people of the decision
(Shenhav and Greene, 2010). However, as illustrated in Figure 1,
the probability of utilitarian responses is constantly higher for
the choice of action than for judgment. This may seem counter-
intuitive at first glance, as choice of action should imply more
personal consequences and thus the sacrifice of someone should
be more affectively laden. A possible explanation could be that the
mechanism involved in choice of action overlap considerably with
those engaged in self-interested decisions (Shenhav and Greene,
2010). Because it is rewarding to save a maximum number of peo-
ple choice of action would be less influenced by emotions, and
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thus more utilitarian (“economically rational”). Oppositely, the
psychological mechanism involved in judgment is an impersonal
evaluation of domain-general contextual information strongly
influenced by cultural norms and secondary prosocial emotions
integration (Moll et al., 2005; Tassy et al., 2012). These secondary
emotions would come into play and bias judgment responses
toward less utilitarianism.
As expected from results of previous psychological studies, par-
ticipants’ decisions are generally less utilitarian when potential vic-
tims are more affectively related to them (O’Neill and Petrinovich,
1998). This is true for both judgment and choice. Interestingly
however, the effect is significantly stronger in the choice of action
than in the judgment condition (ORchoice>ORjudgment),
which reveals that affective proximity influences more choice of
action than judgment, as also reported by Kurzban et al. (2012).
A potential explanation could be that implication of a kin has
strong personal consequences that are most decisive in action
choice (Thomas et al., 2011). Indeed, action choice entails self-
relevant consequences whereas making judgments mostly relies
on an impersonal objective evaluation of the situation that has no
personal consequences (Sood and Forehand, 2005). The stronger
effect of affective proximity on choice has a consequence: while
the probability of utilitarian responses is higher for choice of
action than for judgment in the case of low affective proximity,
an opposite effect is observed for close affective proximity.
This suggests that choice of action becomes less utilitarian than
judgment as the level of personal consequences worsen, most likely
because of a greater influence of primary emotional contextual
information (Greene et al., 2001). Judgment would be less prone
to such primary emotions elicited by taking into account personal
consequences. This differential influence of a single parameter on
judgment and choice of action is coherent with a recent rTMS
study suggesting that objective evaluative judgment and subjec-
tive action choice during decision making in the context of moral
dilemma rely on distinct cognitive processes (Tassy et al., 2012).
CONCLUSION
The present study provides empirical evidence that abstract judg-
ment and hypothetical choice of action are differently influenced
by variations of contextual parameters during moral dilemma
evaluation. This provides an experimental evidence for a diver-
gence between judgment and choice of action during moral eval-
uation, suggesting that moral judgment and moral choice may
be underlied by distinct psychological mechanisms (Tassy et al.,
2012). This finding may shed new light on the mechanisms behind
some of our most important social decisions, namely policy deci-
sions involving affect and life and death stakes for large numbers of
people such as what happened during 9/11 when the US authori-
ties had to decide, at least for the second plane, whether or not they
should shoot down a commercial plane full of civilians in order
to save thousands of individuals stuck in the Twin Towers. This
differentiation between evaluative judgments and actual choices
of action opens a way for exploring moral cognition, notably to
allow better understanding of pathologies that affect social skills.
In this respect, such a battery of moral dilemmas and their varia-
tions in two dimensions may be useful for future research aimed at
evaluating moral cognition, especially in the case of psychopathic
behaviors.
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APPENDIX
STIMULI
For review purpose, we translated from French to English one
moral dilemma and one control dilemma.
Example of the eight versions of one Moral dilemma (Each
participant respond to only one of the eight versions).
Affective proximity variations (A, B, C, D)
A. Votre frère vient de tomber du bateau de sauvetage en mer
dont vous êtes le capitaine. Si vous faites demi-tour pour aller le
chercher, vous ne pourrez pas sauver les 4 marins d’un bateau
naufragé.
Est-il acceptable d’abandonner son frère pour secourir 4
marins?
Abandonnez-vous votre frère pour secourir 4 marins?
English: Your brother fell off a coastguard boat of which you are
the captain. If you turn back to rescue him, you will not be able to
save four sailors of a sinking boat.
Is it acceptable to abandon your brother to save the four sailors?
Do you abandon your brother to rescue the four sailors?
B. Votre cousin vient de tomber du bateau de sauvetage en mer
dont vous êtes le capitaine. Si vous faites demi-tour pour aller le
chercher, vous ne pourrez pas sauver les four marins d’un bateau
naufragé.
Est-il acceptable d’abandonner votre cousin pour secourir 4
marins?
Abandonnez-vous votre cousin pour secourir 4 marins?
English: Your cousin fell off a coastguard boat of which you are
the captain. If you turn back to rescue him, you will not be able to
save four sailors of a sinking boat.
Is it acceptable to abandon your cousin to save the four sailors?
Do you abandon your cousin to rescue the four sailors?
C. Un de vos copains vient de tomber du bateau de sauvetage en
mer dont vous êtes le capitaine. Si vous faites demi-tour pour aller
le chercher, vous ne pourrez pas sauver les 4 marins d’un bateau
naufragé.
Est-il acceptable d’abandonner un de vos copains pour secourir
4 marins?
Abandonnez-vous un de vos copains pour secourir 4 marins?
English: One of your friend fell off a coastguard boat of which
you are the captain. If you turn back to rescue him, you will not
be able to save four sailors of a sinking boat.
Is it acceptable to abandon one of your friends to save the four
sailors?
Do you abandon one of your friends to rescue the four sailors?
D. Un marin vient de tomber du bateau de sauvetage en mer
dont vous êtes le capitaine. Si vous faites demi-tour pour aller le
chercher, vous ne pourrez pas sauver les 4 marins d’un bateau
naufragé.
Est-il acceptable d’abandonner un marin pour secourir 4
marins?
Abandonnez-vous un marin pour secourir 4 marins?
English: A sailor fell off a coastguard boat of which you are the
captain. If you turn back to rescue him, you will not be able to save
four sailors of a sinking boat.
Is it acceptable to abandon a sailor to save the four sailors?
Do you abandon a sailor to rescue the four sailors?
Number of beneficiaries variations (E, F, G, H)
E. Un marin vient de tomber du bateau de sauvetage en mer
dont vous êtes le capitaine. Si vous faites demi-tour pour aller le
chercher, vous ne pourrez pas sauver les 2 marins d’un bateau
naufragé.
Est-il acceptable d’abandonner un marin pour secourir 2
marins?
Abandonnez-vous un marin pour secourir 2 marins?
English: A sailor fell off a coastguard boat of which you are the
captain. If you turn back to rescue him, you will not be able to save
two sailors of a sinking boat.
Is it acceptable to abandon a sailor to save the two sailors?
Do you abandon a sailor to rescue the two sailors?
F. Un marin vient de tomber du bateau de sauvetage en mer
dont vous êtes le capitaine. Si vous faites demi-tour pour aller
le chercher, vous ne pourrez pas sauver les 8 marins d’un bateau
naufragé.
Est-il acceptable d’abandonner un marin pour secourir 8
marins?
Abandonnez-vous un marin pour secourir 8 marins?
English: A sailor fell off a coastguard boat of which you are the
captain. If you turn back to rescue him, you will not be able to save
eight sailors of a sinking boat.
Is it acceptable to abandon a sailor to save the eight sailors?
Do you abandon a sailor to rescue the eight sailors?
G. Un marin vient de tomber du bateau de sauvetage en mer
dont vous êtes le capitaine. Si vous faites demi-tour pour aller le
chercher, vous ne pourrez pas sauver les dizaines de marins d’un
bateau naufragé.
Est-il acceptable d’abandonner un marin pour secourir des
dizaines de marins?
Abandonnez-vous un marin pour secourir des dizaines de
marins?
English: A sailor fell off a coastguard boat of which you are the
captain. If you turn back to rescue him, you will not be able to save
tens of sailors of a sinking boat.
Is it acceptable to abandon a sailor to save tens of sailors?
Do you abandon a sailor to rescue tens of sailors?
H. Un marin vient de tomber du bateau de sauvetage en mer
dont vous êtes le capitaine. Si vous faites demi-tour pour aller le
chercher, vous ne pourrez pas sauver les centaines de marins d’un
bateau naufragé.
Est-il acceptable d’abandonner un marin pour secourir les
centaines de marins?
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Abandonnez-vous un marin pour secourir les centaines de
marins?
English: A sailor fell off a coastguard boat of which you are the
captain. If you turn back to rescue him, you will not be able to save
hundreds of sailors of a sinking boat.
Is it acceptable to abandon a sailor to save the hundreds of
sailors?
Do you abandon a sailor to rescue the hundreds of sailors?
EXAMPLE OF ONE NON-MORAL DILEMMA
Vous allez dans une librairie pour acheter 50 C de livres. Vous avez
un bon de réduction de 25% qui expire aujourd’hui. Vous avez
un bon de réduction de 30% qui expire dans un an, donc vous
pourrez l’utiliser plus tard.
Est-il acceptable d’utiliser le bon de 25% de réduction, plutôt
que celui de 30% qui expire dans 1 an?
Utilisez-vous le bon de 25% de réduction, plutôt que celui de
30% qui expire dans 1 an?
English: You go into a bookstore to buy for 50 C pounds. You
have a coupon of 25% which expires today. You also have a coupon
of 30% which expires in a year, so you can use it later.
Is it acceptable to use the correct 25% discount coupon, rather
than the 30% coupon that expires in 1 year?
Do you use the 25% discount coupon, rather than the 30%
coupon that expires in 1 year?
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